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Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 615 F.3d 1069, 2010 WL 2991395, 2010 U.S. 
App. Lexis 15969 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2010). 
 
Matt Newman 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Pit River Tribe of northern California sued the U.S. Forest service for not conducting 
a full environmental impact statement on a proposed natural gas plant near a sacred site.  The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a district court‟s remand order to a Forest Service 
administrative panel did not constitute a final decision by a court and therefore the order itself 
was not subject to appellate review.  Furthermore, the Court held that where a gas lease was 
extended past its original terms and the extension was later rejected because it violated NEPA, 
the lessee had a right to reclaim the original lease and was not subject to an open bid process. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
on August 2, 2010.
323
  The court faced two issues on appeal.  First, whether an appellate court 
could exercise jurisdiction over a case where the trial court had not rendered a “final decision,” 
and second, whether a geothermal lease should be subject to reclamation by the original 
leaseholder at the end of litigation.
324
  The court‟s decision was not the first concerning the Pit 
River Tribe‟s dispute with federal agencies and the Calpine Corporation, a natural resource 
development firm.
325
  In this second round of litigation, the court found itself having to act as the 
                                                          
323
 Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2010 WL 2991395 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2010). 
324
 Id. 
325
 Id. at *1. 
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interpreter of its first Pit River decision (Pit River I)
326
 because the disputes in second round of 
litigation (Pit River II) were over what mandate was created by the court‟s order in Pit River I.327 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 In 1988, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) entered into two ten-year geothermal 
lease agreements with a developer near Medicine Lake in Northern California, a place of cultural 
significance to the Pit River Tribe (Pit River) and other Native American groups in the region.
328
  
These leases were later acquired by the Calpine Corporation, which proceeded to drill 
exploratory wells in the leased areas.
329
  In 1995, after extensive exploration of the leases, 
Calpine submitted a plan to the BLM and other federal agencies to build a power plant in an area 
called Fourmile Hill.
330
  In May 1998, the BLM extended Calpine‟s original 1988 leases for five 
years.
331
 
 In September 1998, the BLM and the other federal agencies released a complete 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the proposed Fourmile Hill power plant and in 2000 
issued a Record of Decision (ROD) approving the plant.
332
  In 2002, BLM extended Calpine‟s 
leases for an additional forty years.
333
  Subsequently, the Pit River Tribe filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of California, claiming the federal agencies granting 
the lease extensions had violated several federal laws during the leasing process, including the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA).
334
 
                                                          
326
 Pit River Tribe v. United States Forest Service, 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006). 
327
 Pit River II, 2010 WL 2991395 at *2.  
328
 Id. at *1. 
329
 Id. 
330
 Id. 
331
 Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 3203.1-4(c) (1998)). 
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 Id. 
333
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III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the agencies and Calpine, and 
Pit River appealed.
335
  In Pit River I, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court‟s grant of 
summary judgment for the agencies and Calpine and held the agencies should have completed an 
EIS before granting the May 1998 lease extensions.
336
  Furthermore, the court held that the 
September 1998 EIS on the Fourmile Hill power plant did not remedy the agencies‟ oversight.337  
Because the 1998 and 2002 lease extensions were granted in violation of NEPA and NHPA, the 
court held they must be undone.
338
  Furthermore, because the approval of the Fourmile Hill 
power plant was based on lease extensions that were invalidated, the court held that Fourmile 
Hill project must be halted as well.
339
  The court remanded the issue back to the district court 
with orders to grant summary judgment in favor of Pit River.
340
  On remand, Calpine and the 
agencies argued that the district court need only reconsider the May 1998 lease extensions and 
the subsequent decisions based on those extensions, such as the Fourmile Hill approval and the 
2002 lease extensions.
341
  Pit River argued that because the original 1988 leases had long since 
expired and all lease extensions were invalidated by the Ninth Circuit, Calpine had no rights to 
the geothermal deposit, and a new open bid leasing process must begin.
342
 
 As ordered by the Ninth Circuit, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Pit River on the claims that the agencies violated federal law.
343
  However, the district court did 
not accept Pit River‟s argument that the leasing process for the Medicine Lake site must start 
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 Id. (citing Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 785-786). 
338
 Id. at **1-2 (citing Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 788). 
339
 Id. at *2 (citing Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 788).  
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 Id. (citing Pit River I, 469 F,3d at 788). 
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over, stating that a “mere finding of a NEPA violation does not automatically and retroactively 
invalidate anything.”344  Rather, the district court remanded to the agencies with instructions to 
perform the proper NEPA and NHPA reviews and deliver a new EIS for the future lease 
extensions and the Fourmile Hill project, giving the BLM complete discretion to end or extend 
the leases to the Medicine Lake site.
345
  Pit River again appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
346
 
IV.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN PIT RIVER II 
A.  Jurisdiction Issues 
 The Ninth Circuit's three-judge panel unanimously delivered the decision in Pit River 
II.
347
  Before determining the merits of Pit River‟s claims, the court performed a detailed analysis 
of several jurisdictional issues, focusing on whether the district court had issued a “final 
decision,” and if not, whether the court still had jurisdiction to hear the case.348 
 Both Calpine and Pit River asserted that the court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.
349
  That section states that appellate jurisdiction extends only to the “final decisions of the 
district courts.”350  Remand orders are generally not considered final decisions.351  The Ninth 
Circuit established the exception to this general rule in Alsea Valley Alliance v. Department of 
Commerce, where the court held that a remand order can be considered a final decision when: 
(1) the district court conclusively resolves a separable legal issue, 
(2) the remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule which may                                    
result in a wasted proceeding, and 
(3) review would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were      
unavailable.
352
 
 
                                                          
344
 Id.  
345
 Id. 
346
 Id. 
347
 J. Clifford Wallace, Senior Circuit Judge, Sidney R. Thomas, and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges. 
348
 Pit River II, 2010 WL 2991395 at *3. 
349
 Id. 
350
 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006)). 
351
 Id. (citing Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
352
 Id. (citing Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dept. of Com., 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004)).  
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 In Alsea, a private party challenged a regulation passed by the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS).
353
  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alsea and 
remanded the matter to the NMFS.
354
  As a result of the remand, the Oregon Natural Resources 
Council (ORNC), fearing the NMFS would not challenge the district court‟s remand, filed an 
appeal with the Ninth Circuit to overturn the remand.
355
  The court held the district court‟s 
remand order failed the third prong of the test and therefore, was not a final decision.
356
  The 
court concluded that the appeal by the ONRC was unnecessary because the NMFS had not yet 
acted on the remand order.
357
  The court reasoned that the ONRC would have as much power as 
any concerned party in lobbying the NMFS to render a fair administrative decision.
358
  If after 
the final administrative decision was made, the ONRC still felt wronged, it could file an appeal 
of that decision, but until that point the ONRC had to exhaust its administrative remedies.
359
 
 In Pit River II, the court rejected the argument that the district court‟s remand order was a 
final decision.
360
  The court stated that because no administrative decision had been made as a 
result of the district court‟s remand, neither party could assert they have suffered from the 
remand.
361
  The court noted that both parties would have the power to participate in the 
administrative process in order to effect a fair decision.
362
  Until an administrative decision was 
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 Id. (citing Alsea, 358 F.3d at 1183). 
354
 Id. (citing Alsea, 358 F.3d at 1183). 
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 Id. (citing Alsea, 358 F.3d at 1184).  
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reached by the agencies, the court held that any ruling would be unnecessary.
363
  Because no 
final decision was made, the court ruled it had no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
364
 
 Arguing in the alternative, Calpine asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(1), 
which gives an appellate court jurisdiction district court‟s interlocutory orders refusing an 
injunction.
365
  In Alsea, the court described 12 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as “„a limited exception to the 
final-judgment rule,‟ which should be construed „narrowly.‟”366 
 Calpine‟s argument in favor of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction was that the district 
court refused Pit River‟s request for a preliminary injunction when remanded to the agencies 
rather than setting the leases aside. The court rejected this interpretation of Pit River‟s argument, 
pointing out that Pit River did not argue for an injunction cancelling or invalidating the leases, 
but instead argued the leases could not be extended as a matter of law.
367
  As a result, the court 
held it had no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(1).
368
 
 Pit River's final argument was that appellate jurisdiction existed under the All Writs Act 
(28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)) because the remand order of the district court violated the mandate of the 
Pit River I decision.
369
  The All Writs Act allows appellate courts to issue writs of mandamus “to 
confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to 
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.”370  When an order by a lower court violates the 
mandate of a higher court, a writ of mandamus may be issued and appellate jurisdiction 
established.
371
  Citing Vizcaino v. U.S. District Court, the court granted a writ of mandamus 
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 Id. (citing Will v. U.S., 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)). 
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 Id. (citing Vizcaino v. U.S. District Court, 173 F.3d 713, 718-719 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
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under the All Writs Act to determine whether the district court‟s remand order violated the 
“letter and spirit” of the Pit River I decision.372 
B.  The Medicine Lake Leases 
 On appeal, Pit River argued that the district court‟s remand order was inappropriate 
because the 1988 leases to the Medicine Lake site had expired and would thus be incapable of 
extension after the ordered environmental reviews.
373
  In support of its argument, Pit River cited 
passages from the Pit River I decision where the court stated that the lease extensions violated 
NEPA and must be undone.
374
 
 The court first rejected Pit River‟s argument that, because the 1988 leases had expired 
and the Pit River I decision invalidated any extension, a new open-bid leasing process must 
begin.
375
  The court stated that allowing a litigant who successfully challenged a lease extension 
to deprive a lessee of all contractual rights would set a dangerous precedent.
376
  The court 
determined that the only way to interpret Pit River I was that where there is a successful 
challenge to a lease extension the result can only be the undoing of the lease extension and not 
the entire lease.
377
  The court held that the district court did not violate the mandate of Pit River I 
when it ordered that the 1988 leases be deemed capable of extension after proper environmental 
review by the federal agencies.
378
 
 In its conclusion, the court stated that it would “substantially” uphold the remand order of 
the district court, with two minor exceptions.
379
  The first was a mischaracterization by the 
district court of a passage in Pit River I which the court determined was, as “a practical matter,” 
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a harmless error, and the second was a typographical error that both parties addressed in their 
appellate briefs.
380
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The court in Pit River II established two precedents for future courts to consider.  First, 
the detailed analysis of when an appellate court has jurisdiction where there is no “final 
decision” by a lower court provides a road map for district courts to use in the future.  Second, 
the court affirmatively established the vested right of a lessee to reclaim their lease even if the 
original terms have expired during litigation, and all lease extensions have been invalidated. 
  
                                                          
380
 Id. at **12-14.  In its remand order, the district court used the word “until” where it meant “unit.”  This caused 
the parties to dispute the proper interpretation over the meaning of the usage of “until” in the remand order.  Id. at 
*14. 
